THE GENERAL RULE. It is the general rule that delegated authority cannot be delegated, the maxim being, "Delegatus non potest dekgari." That is, without authority express or implied to employ a sub-agent, it is presumed that the authority given an agent is personal and cannot be dele gated to another so as to bind the principal. The foundation of the rule is the presumption that a prin cipal appoints one his agent with reference to his fit ness for the intended post. v. Boynton, 37 N. H. 9; Loomis v. Simpson, 13 Ia. 532.) Whether the authority of the agent to substitute an other for himself will be implied, must depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. It is safe to say, however, that authority for an agent to delegate the execution of his trust to another will not be inferred in any case where the performance of the agent's duty involves the exercise of special care, skill, judgment or discretion (Planters Bank v. National Bank, 75 N. C. 634; Emerson v. Providence Hat Co., 12 Mass. 237); nor will such authority be inferred where personal trust and confidence is imposed. Hence it is held that the general administration of a trading company can not lawfully be transferred to another by an agent to whom such trust has been confided. (Emerson v. Prov idence Hat Co., supra.) So an agent cannot delegate his power to execute commercial paper for his princi pal. And, an attorney cannot transfer his attorneyship to conduct a case to another without the express con sent of his client. (Eggleston v. Boardman, 37 Mich.