THE CONSIDERATION FOR THE PROMISE OF THE SURETY OR GUAR ANTOR. Except when under seal, the contract of the surety or guarantor must be supported by a sufficient consideration, and this is determined by the same principles as govern in the case of the ordinary contract. The smallness of the amount of the consideration does not matter, so long as it is not such a consideration as would be opposed to public policy. (Davis v. Wells, io4 U. S., 159; Rouse V. Glissman, 29 Ill. App., 321.) "When the guaranty is contemporaneous with the creation of the original liability, the same con sideration will support the guaranty which supports the principal contract. In such a case the credit is given to both, and not to one alone, although only one may derive any substantial benefit from the transaction. But where the guaranty is given after the principal contract is made, the guaranty must be supported by a new and independent con sideration, unless it was given subsequently, in pursuance of a contemporaneous agreement to that effect." Thus where the promise that a surety or guarantor will become liable is given as an inducement to the creditor to extend credit to the principal, this is a sufficient consideration to support the contract of the surety or guarantor who subsequently signs. (Paul v. Stackhouse, 38 Pa. St., 302; Standley v. Miles, 36 Miss., 434•) A promise for a promise will be a sufficient con sideration to support the contract of the guarantor or surety, as where the creditor agrees to extend the time of payment and the guarantor or surety there upon agrees to be answerable for the debt. (Fuller v. Scott, 8 Kans., 25; Lee v. Wisner, 38 Mich., 82.) But an executed consideration to the principal, that is, where the consideration is founded on some thing already done and passed, as on account of fur ther time already given to the principal, such by-gon consideration is not sufficient to support the promise of the guarantor or surety, and the contract will be void, except where there was a previous request by the surety or guarantor to the creditor (Williams v. Marshall, 42 Barb., 524; Ludwick v. Watsbn, 3 Oreg., 256; Ashton v. Bayard, 71 Pa. St., 139.) If the writ ten promise of the surety to answer for the debt of another, be made in consideration of something to be done, as in consideration of goods to be supplied, legal proceedings to be staid, and the like, the con-• sideration is sufficient. (Westhead v. Sproson, 6 H. & N., 728).